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Abstract 
 
The deeply engrained nature of social media in modern life have provided ease of access to 
information and speed of use within almost every aspect of a person’s life. These same benefit 
are also available to terrorists and their organizations. The same technology that allows for a 
globalized world to interact without regard for distance or physical location is also utilized, 
exploited and adapted to by terrorist organizations to conduct operations, reach candidates and 
ensure organizational longevity.  
 
This article takes the position of observer of these advancements with the end goal of 
informing counter-violent extremism strategists of the advances that terrorist groups have 
already made in digital technology; and where the priority of intervention strategies should be 
aimed. Further, this is intended to guide policy makers to embrace and utilize digital 
technologies as a mechanism to carry counter-radicalization and counter-violent extremism 
interventions through the same digital potential and reach the same audiences as terrorist 
organizations. What appears strongly apparent is that social media will not abate from its 
intrinsic position graphed into daily life. This means that counter-terrorism, counter-
radicalization and counter-violent extremism strategies must take up the same technology in 
order to effectively discredit and nullify extremist groups – a digital problem needs a digital 
solution.  
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Introduction & Focus 
How have terrorist organizations benefited from social media advances? The short 
answer is that social media has delivered advantages across many varied operational spheres 
and hence, have come to be a greatly beneficial modern asset to terrorist organizations.  
Social media activities of terrorist organizations can broadly be grouped into two 
categories. These categories are not mutually exclusive to each other and as will be 
discovered, there is often crossover between the aim and activity of these two categories.  
The first category could be termed as the communication benefit, which encompasses 
recruitment through reaching out to potential radicals, creating group forums, collaborating 
with terrorist associates, administering digital training environments, coordinating 
organizational activity and propagating terrorist organization material (Thomas, 2003; Mishra, 
2003; Rogan, 2006; Conway, 2005; Aly, 2016; Klausen, 2015; Conway, 2016). Furthermore, 
the social media revolution has provided a level of secrecy and clandestine communication, 
avoiding detection through easily delivered, yet effective encryption protocols that are 
provided by services such as Whatsapp and some Apple.inc platforms (McMillan, 2016). This 
article will explore social media as a prominent strategic aspect of terrorist organizations 
modus operandi that has become intrinsic to recruitment, operational planning and engaging 
between radicals and organizations beyond intervention (Thomas, 2003; Mishra, 2003; 
Rogan, 2006, Conway, 2005; Aly, 2016; Klausen, 2015; Conway, 2016). 
The second category of activity could be termed as operational digital action, which 
includes digital activities of terrorist organizations that are intended to spread terror. These 
operational digital actions may include cyber-based sabotage of infrastructure, or propagating 
fear of attack through threat (Thomas, 2003; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004). Furthermore, 
operational digital actions also take in activity that exploit open and restricted source data 
holdings in order to obtain intelligence assets, support operational financing, operation 
planning and coordinating activities (Denning, 2001; Thomas, 2003; West, 2014).  
 
Social Media in Terrorism & Extremism Communication 
 From research, it appears overwhelmingly likely that the greatest benefit to terrorist 
organizations of social media has been the evolution of communication capability, and this is 
where this discussion shall begin. Mishra (2003) describes terrorism as being symbolic 
communication that consists of four distinct pieces of a communication formula, all of which 
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are needed to achieve the goal of spreading terror. The first piece is the transmitter of the 
information, this is the terrorist who appears on a video or records a propaganda speech and 
distributes the terrorist groups message, perhaps the most traditionally recognised example of 
this might be a propaganda video (Mishra, 2003). The second piece of this communication 
formula is the message, or the meaning behind the transmission, which will be designed to 
serve the communication goals of a particular group (Mishra, 2003). This may include video 
of attacks, twisted ideological teachings or a group’s founding principles (Mishra, 2003). 
Thirdly, the communication formula must reach an audience - there would be little point to 
conducting attacks that are not publicised, as this would extensively limit the achieved goal of 
propagating terror amongst a target audience (Mishra, 2003; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004; Soo 
Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg, 2008; Aly, 2016). This is consistent with the assertion of Grob-
Fitzgibbon (2004) that the end-gaol of a terrorist group is not actually to target specific 
individuals or societal sectors, instead to spread fear of attack amongst a wider group or 
communities. Furthermore, as Braddock and Horgan (2015) identity, through effective 
utilization of social media platforms, particularly Twitter, Islamic State reaches an expansive 
audience of followers, potential recruits, combatant entities and opposition through social 
media communication. Returning to Mishra’s (2003) communication formula, the fourth 
requirement is feedback, or the response of the audience. This response requirement also 
supports that the primary intent of terrorist groups is not necessarily to kill or injure one 
individual person, rather it is to spread fear and terror amongst a community (Grob-
Fitzgibbon, 2004; Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg, 2008). In considering this end-goal of 
terrorist groups as being to spread terror, the benefit that social media provide is extensive and 
undeniable. Furthermore, Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg go so far as to say that: 
 
“The rise of indiscriminate terrorism is partly a product of the modern electronic mass 
media, as terrorists may commit these acts almost exclusively for the publicity that 
they generate” (Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg, 2008. pg.137). 
 
This clearly demonstrates the benefit that social media has provided to Jihadis, as an 
exceptionally effective method of reaching out to an audience (whether willing or not) in 
order to propagate messages or media content that meets the goal of spreading terror (Grob-
Fitzgibbon, 2004, Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg, 2008; Klausen, 2015). The clear benefit 
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of digital technologies, such as the internet, to meet this goal is the simplifying and 
accessibility of all aspects of communication that the internet provides, as well as providing 
this access at relatively low operating cost (Thomas, 2003; Koehler, 2014).  
While not the only component of the digital revolution, the internet is arguably the 
most integrated, adaptive and expansive feature and hence the provider of greatest benefit if 
exploited effectively (Harrison, 2002; Conway, 2005; Mackinlay, 2009). The importance and 
inherent advantage of the internet to terrorist organizations lies in its purpose as a user-
friendly communication device (Conway, 2005; Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). To illustrate 
this advantage, Conway (2005) notes the ease at which one can seek out and find bomb-
making instructions, among other illicit and dangerous material. The internet’s highly 
advantageous purpose as an easily accessible information portal and communication channel 
is stated as: 
 
 “The internet was designed to maximize simplicity of communication, not security of 
communication. The price for this has been the increasing opportunity from criminals 
or wrongdoers to exploit the vulnerabilities of the network for their own ends” 
(Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006, pg. 225).  
 
This means that the internet itself, as a digital advancement, has provided a strategic 
benefit to terrorist organizations (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). This benefit is delivered 
through the purpose of the internet’s design, being that it strives to streamline communication 
channels and is not overly onerous in terms of scrutiny (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006). The 
benefit of the internet as a communication apparatus is clear, as simplified communication 
with little oversight is exceedingly beneficial to clandestine activities. The clear benefit of 
communication capabilities that terrorist organizations benefit from includes recruitment, 
propaganda dissemination, global linkage between terrorists as well as action coordination 
through digital communication technology (Thomas, 2003; Weimann, 2006; Rogan, 2006). 
These facets are defined by Weimann (2006) as computer mediated communication, who 
explains further that terrorist organization operations are well suited to the use of the internet 
in stating: 
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“…it is de-centralized, it cannot be subject to control or restriction, it is not censored, 
and it allows access to anyone who wants it” (Weimann, 2006. pg. 25).   
 
The above statement of Weimann (2006) is simplistic to the point that it loses some 
accuracy, as several examples of state-instigated internet censorship do exist (Denning, 2001). 
However, if this statement of Weimann (2006) is considered only as a concept, it supports the 
assertions of others that the internet has been so voraciously taken up as a communication 
mechanism by terrorist organizations, as it provides the perception of anonymity as well as 
safe space beyond the reach of state authorities (Weimann, 2006; Rogan, 2006; Von Behr, 
Reding, Edwards and Gribbon, 2013; Tehrani, Manap and Taji, 2013; Koehler, 2014). 
The manner in which social media has affected terrorist organization recruiting 
practices is broadly that these technologies have provided the ability to digitally cross borders 
unseen and has shown these organizations into the home of any potential radical. 
Organizational recruiting can be viewed from two points, being the overcoming of distance 
and sovereign boundaries (Labi, 2006), as well as the greatly increased ability to distribute 
propaganda (Thomas, 2003; Mohamedou, 2015; Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis & Chen, 2016). 
Recruitment of potential terrorists and dissemination of group propaganda are interlinked 
activities, as it is highly likely that propaganda is a significant factor in the radicalization of a 
terrorist, accordingly these subjects will be discussed side by side (Pretch, 2007; The Clarion 
Project, 2014). Labi (2006) supports the notion that through harnessing digital communication 
technology advances, terrorist groups have been able to make terrorism borderless within 
cyber environments. This however is not the extent of benefit that social media has brought to 
recruitment and radicalisation. In terms of radicalisation, Aly, Macdonald et al (2016) refer to 
a staged progression through an online platform, which first introduces the potential jihadi to 
the organization’s ideology, through to enrolment, progressing to methods of participating in 
the organization through activity and connecting the new jihadi to others within the 
organization. Referring specially to Al Qaeda, Aly, Macdonald et al (2016) describe a 
grassroots-driven recruitment strategy, in that violent extremist propaganda is made readily 
available via internet or social media platforms, which can be sought out by potential Jihadis, 
essentially relying to some extent on online self-radicalisation. Conway also notes that 
terrorist group’s recruitment practices have benefited by information communication 
technology advancements in stating: 
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“… it [the internet sic] makes information gathering easier for potential recruits by 
offering more information, more quickly, and in multimedia format” (Conway, 2005. 
pg. 12).  
 
While dealing specifically with the social media prominence of the Al Qaeda network, 
Rudner (2016) refers to the inherent connectivity and extremist resource availability as being 
a valuable tool in the recruitment of Jihadis, which have been more successful in recruitment 
than conventional person to person means have been.  
There are clear consistencies in theory between Conway (2005), Aly, Macdonald et al 
(2016) and Rudner (2016) in that these sources note that an advantage of the internet and 
social media has been the ease of availability, extensive volume of material and the ease at 
which this material can be provided. The benefit from this aspect is the ability to so readily 
support recruitment, however the further benefit is the creation of a substantial digital 
presence that may give an organization prominence and influence due perhaps to the size of 
one organization’s digital presence, which it may otherwise not have. Meaning, an 
organizations virtual size and resulting influence is likely to be far greater than a non-digital 
terrorist organization could hope to evolve to.  
This aspect of the benefit that terrorist organizations take from social media is summed up 
effectively by Rudner, who states 
 
 “The Internet and social media, for their part, offer radical preachers, 
strategists, and enthusiasts especially advantageous capabilities for 
reaching out and influencing, inciting, and motivating jihadist 
activism at a global level” (Rudner, 2016. pg.4). 
 
Communication between terrorist organizations, vulnerable persons and potential 
Jihadis is greatly benefited through the availability of these cyber environments such as 
forums, social media platforms, webpages, blogs, post boards and email (Denning, 2001; 
House of Commons, United Kingdom, 2012; Klausen, 2015, Aly, Macdonald et al, 2016). 
The advantage of digital technology to terrorist groups is clear, social media crosses borders 
and allows groups to connect associates and reach out to persons vulnerable to radicalization 
(Mackinlay, 2009; Torok, 2013). The ease of communication from any place on Earth to any 
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place on Earth is a significant strategic benefit that terrorist organizations are exploiting. As 
an example of this global linkage, Coker (2002) describes Al Qaeda as being an organization 
that is built on networks, possessing global resources that can be accessed to coordinate 
operations, and thus shows Al Qaeda to be a true beneficiary of globalized social media 
communication. This almost unfettered ability to communication with like-minded associates, 
reach out to those who are vulnerable to radicalization as well as making terrorist propaganda 
so readily accessible are clear advantages to terrorist organizations. Further, as Von Behr, 
Reding, et al (2013) note, the internet has provided terrorist groups and individuals with a safe 
environment, suited to clandestine activities as it provides a potential measure of secrecy and 
anonymity. Additionally, the internet provides quick access to information, like-minded 
community forums that is also benefited through the perception that cyber environments are 
beyond immediate oversight and without intervention in opposition to activities that would 
otherwise be encountered, had the same extremist material been sought in a physical 
environment (Von Behr, Reding, et al, 2013). This perception of safety within the online 
environment is also supported by Koehler, who states: 
 
“The Internet provides a perceived constraint-free space and anonymity. This 
provokes or motivates individuals to speak or act out more radically online as they 
would normally do offline” (Koehler, 2014. pg. 118). 
 
Koehler (2014) primarily bases findings of internet use amongst extremist 
organizations in the context of former right-wing Neo-Nazi’s of Germany. What is observed 
from the extreme right-wing Neo-Nazi example is that amongst the significant majority of 
former-extremists, the use of the internet had become part of the normal organizational 
operation and is used heavily in communication, disseminating propaganda and coordinating 
administrational responsibilities amongst group members (Koehler, 2014). The question from 
this example is why has the internet become such a fundamental operating tool of the 
extremist groups? The answer is, in addition to the obvious benefits to communication, 
logistical barriers, social constraints and risk of being detected while operating within a cyber-
environment are perceived to be reduced or not existing within a digital realm (Von Behr, 
Reding et al, 2013; Koehler, 2014). The benefit that the use of the internet in the manners that 
these right-wing Neo-Nazi’s used it is, as they perceived, that the internet provides a 
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clandestine environment as well as the ability to access extremist material that is only 
constrained by the speed of one’s internet connection (Von Behr, Reding et al, 2013; Koehler, 
2014). Koehler (2014) also notes a belief amongst subjects that if communicating with fellow 
extremists or participating in organizational activity online, they had positioned themselves 
outside the jurisdiction of any state law enforcement. This perception of secrecy and being 
beyond intervention is also beneficial to terrorist organizations, as it is likely to cause 
terrorists to feel that they are impervious to law enforcement intervention and perhaps become 
more willing to complete activities on behalf of a terrorist organization.  
 Khalil (2014) also provides valuable commentary of the benefit that digital technology 
advances have provided to terrorist organizations and notes that around 1998, Al Qaeda 
recognised the value of propagating a message through commercial media avenues. However, 
prior to the expansive availability of the internet, the ability of terrorist organizations to self-
publicise was minimal and all were heavily dependent on traditional media outlets (Khalil, 
2014; Klausen, 2015). However, as the internet and social media emerged, the ability of 
terrorist groups to self-publicise increased extensively through platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter, as well as uploading material for the access of followers through platforms 
including forums, web-pages and video hosting websites (Torok, 2013; Khalil, 2014; Simon, 
Goldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin and Adini, 2014; Torres-Soriano, 2016). Denning 
(2001) also refers to the internet being capable of overcoming censorships and refers to the 
ability to access information that may be restricted from publication in commercial media.  
This outlines that social media and internet advancements has provided key operational 
advantages to terrorist organizations, in that it has removed the reliance on third party media 
and allows organizations to self-propagate their own material, and further have the material 
re-disseminated widely amongst social media networks.  
Heickerö (2014) notes that the use of internet platforms has become key aspects in the 
recruiting strategy of extremist groups and explains that the use of the internet for recruitment 
is multiply-faced, as it is used to reach out to potential jihadists through social media, as well 
as propaganda material being made easily available online. The benefit that is displayed by 
Heickerö (2014) is access and availability of terrorist groups to an audience and potential 
recruits, as well as providing access to terrorist organizations by potential terrorists.  
As has been discussed, terrorism is communication with an audience with an end goal 
being to create terror (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004, Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg, 2008). As 
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Mohamedou (2015) notes, significant advancement in the manner in which Al Qaeda has used 
technology to communicate with the wider public and notes that previously terrorist 
organizations such as Al Qaeda used a mail service to post propaganda video tapes to news 
outlets. This is quite an antiquated manner for Al Qaeda to go about propagating materials to 
the public. Compare this outdated postal method to the current ability for terrorist groups to 
upload videos, pictures, letters and manuals as well as communicate with associates, and what 
is seen is the undeniable benefit in reaching an audience, which is a direct result of social 
media (Neumann, 2012; Mohamedou, 2015; Klausen, 2015). While referring particulary to 
Twitter and Facebook, Klausen supports this stance and states that: “Social media freed Al 
Qaeda from the dependency on mainstream media” (Klausen, 2015. pg.3). 
Setting aside the ease of access to an audience that social media delivers for a moment, 
by self-distributing propaganda via platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, Al Qaeda and 
Islamic State have become chief media editors and no longer limited by the whim of a 
conventional media outlet priorities or constraints. Further, social media completely removes 
a content barrier between the message transmitter and receiver, essentially groups such as Al 
Qaeda are brought into direct communication with their audience and are unchecked, able to 
completely influence the nature of the transmitted message (Klausen, 2015).  
In terms of content and production of media material, advances in this information 
technology field are also extensive and again social media supports groups in transmitting 
these high production quality materials out to an audience. The content that is uploaded for 
access or disseminated through social media are high quality media productions that take 
advantage of advances in digital media and production technology (Mohamedou, 2015). 
While referring to the production quality of Islamic State media propaganda, the United 
States’ Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Jeh Johnson is quoted as stating: “…it’s 
about as slick as I’ve ever seen in terms of advertising and promotion.” (Tadjdeh, 2014. pg. 
1).  
The quality of propaganda materials that are produced, as well as the increased ability 
to disseminate materials are significant advantages for terrorist organizations that are 
attributable to digital technology advancement, which terrorist organizations are taking full 
advantage of.  
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Radicalization & Deployment 
 Related to the above points, radicalization also warrants discussion, as this aspect of 
terrorist organization activity that has greatly benefited from social media (Torok, 2013). In 
plain terms social media has bridged communication barriers and provided ready access to 
both potential recruits as well as easy access to propaganda. The virtual communities of 
terrorist organizations that function through the internet are advantageous to terrorist 
radicalization within numerous focuses (Stevens and Neumann, 2009). These perspectives 
include both online radicalization involving interaction between a potential terrorist and a 
party to the terrorist organization, as well as lone wolf terrorists who are self-radicalised 
online through exposure to non-interactive materials and have no interactive contact with a 
terrorist group (Von Behr, Reding et al, 2013). Social media has aided terrorist organizations 
in radicalizing Jihadis through the methods of recruitment within both online radicalization 
and online self-radicals. This has been supported by the social media aspects of access to 
information as well as potential Jihadis, the borderless nature of virtual communities, as well 
as the access to platforms from which propaganda can be disseminated (Stevens and 
Neumann, 2009; Koehler, 2014; Heickerö, 2014). However, the social media advantage to 
radicalization does not end there. While social media provides such extensive access to a 
virtual community, simultaneously they also limit interaction with the normative world and 
isolate potential radicals from circumstances outside of the cyber environment (Torok, 2013). 
The isolation of a potential terrorist is conducive to that person becoming radicalised at some 
time, as the potential recruit may seek out commonality and comradeship, which may be 
provided by a terrorist organization (Ali, 2013; Atran, 2015; Jones, 2015). This ability of 
terrorist organizations to isolate and then connect with vulnerable recruits with offerings of 
commonality and comradeship would be greatly reduced if social media was just not 
available. What this means is that social media platforms have provided a communications 
advantage that is being expertly exploited by terrorist organizations to radicalise potential 
terrorists. The radicalization of potential terrorists over great distances, as is possible through 
social media provides two further benefits. Firstly, social media is a means used to inspire 
radicals to travel to terrorist group bases, as well as cultivating what have been termed ‘home-
grown terrorists’ to carry out activities within the terrorist’s home country (Neumann, 2012; 
Jones, 2015; Ministry of Education and Home Office, United Kingdom, n.d). The ability to 
deploy ‘home-grown terrorists’ is a distinct advantage to terrorist groups as it requires 
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minimal action and resources (other than an internet connection and a smart phone) on the 
part of the group, but supports the spread of terror and fear amongst an audience in an arena 
that perhaps had not previously been considered a conventional terrorism realm (Grob-
Fitzgibbon, 2004; Dubouloz and Wilner, 2015). In fact, within the Unites States Homeland 
Security Project report, Neumann refers to the weight that should be given to addressing 
home-grown terrorism in stating: 
 
“Arguably, the use of the Internet to radicalize and recruit home-grown terrorists is the 
single-most important and dangerous innovation since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001” (Neumann, 2012, pg. 9).   
 
Closely related to home-grown terrorism is the lone wolf terrorist, involving a 
potential terrorist becoming radicalised through isolated non-interactive exposure to terrorist 
material (Phillips, 2011; Von Behr, Reding, et al, 2013). Social media advantages relevant to 
lone wolf terrorism, to a terrorist organization are very similar to the advantage that a terrorist 
who is radicalised online through interaction with a terrorist organization, being that that both 
the lone wolf terrorist and organization led online radicalised terrorist have the potential to 
commit attacks in home countries far from the organizations base (McCauley, Moskalenko 
and Van Son, 2013; Dubouloz and Wilner, 2015). The advantage of the lone wolf terrorist to a 
terrorist organization, over the organizationally orientated terrorist is the very minimal effort 
that is required to expose a vulnerable person to extremism (Edelman, 2015). Essentially, 
nothing further than uploading an extensive library of terrorist propaganda is required, no 
ongoing coordination is required and the prospect of indiscriminate attack is likely to spread 
terror further than coordinated attacks that may be perceived as being more predictable 
(Edelman, 2015). The benefit to terrorist organizations that can be taken from both category 
of online-radicalised terrorists is that there is potential for terrorists to be radicalised 
exclusively within a cyber environment (Sageman, 2008). Furthermore, in the case of lone 
wolf terrorists, further than providing an accessible library of material, no further action on 
the part of the organization is required. In this situation, the risk weighed against potential 
outcome is beneficial to a terrorist organization.    
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Digital Existence  
The cyber-environment also supports terrorist organizational continuance (Torok, 
2013). Torok (2013) identifies that terrorist organizations use digital technologies to exist 
virtually in response to their physical existence being threatened. Arguably, the clearest 
example of this is the establishment of cyber training groups that have been created in the face 
of terrorism counter-measures that target physical training centres (Torok, 2013; West, 2014). 
Rogan (2006) also supports that the internet has provided terrorist organizations with a cyber-
place to conduct trainings, although Rogan refers to digital terrorist training supporting 
conventional training techniques, rather than replacing physical training environments. The 
description of online training environments that is offered by Rogan (2006) involves posting 
training manuals and instructions for recruited terrorists. Furthermore, Al Qaeda have referred 
to their organizations cyber training environments as Al Qaeda University (Rogan, 2006). 
Ahmad al-Wathiq bi-Llah, an Al Qaeda member, is quoted as describing Al Qaeda University 
graduates as follows: 
 
“…graduates of the al-Qaida University are specialists in electronic jihad, media jihad, 
spiritual and financial jihad, passing through the ‘faculties’ of both morale and 
explosive package technology and exploding cars and trucks” (Rogan, 2006. pg. 27).  
 
This means that the internet, provides terrorist organizations with a safe space beyond 
physical attack, where training material can at worst be removed (Torok, 2013). In this 
manner, the internet and social media support terrorist organization activity in communication 
with recruits, as well as supporting ongoing operational purposes through training. In being 
able to store material and exist in a cyber-space from which they cannot be permanently 
deleted, terrorist organizations have also realised the benefit of being able to remain 
operational in the cyber-environment even if the physical environment is threatened. Viewing 
the internet as a terrorist organization’s safe space is also consistent with the assertions of 
former members right-wing Neo-Nazi groups, who viewed the internet as safe and 
anonymous (Koehler, 2014). Additional to this strategic benefit of safety beyond detection, is 
the ability to conceal oneself within the internet, which for logistical reasons is a far easier 
task than attempting to conceal the physical location of a terrorist organization’s base or 
training camp. Through the use of readily available technology, such as virtual private 
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networks, encryption, or proxy servers an organization or individual can conceal or 
misrepresent their location and identity (Ferguson and Huston, 1998; Broadhurst, Grabosky, 
Alazab and Chon, 2014, Klausen, 2015). The benefit of identity and location 
misrepresentation capability exceeds the advantage of anonymity, as terrorist organizations or 
individual can actively avoid detection.  
Utilising the internet as a means of training and cultivation of potential terrorists 
shows the benefit that terrorist organizations have taken from digital technology as being 
adaptable to a changing environment. In addition to providing a space for learning, teaching 
and collaboration, the internet also provides a decentralising capability that protects data from 
deletion, hence this supports the longevity of a terrorist organization (Denning, 2001; Rogan, 
2006; Klausen, 2015). The beneficial advantage that decentralising an organization’s 
propaganda library is that it can be hosted from virtually any location and copied any number 
of times (Denning, 2001; Rogan, 2006; Klausen, 2015). This raises a further dimension to the 
cyber safe space concept, in that the decentralised nature of the internet as a network protects 
a terrorist organizations continuing existence if at very least as an extensive digital footprint 
(Denning, 2001; Rogan, 2006; Neumann, 2012; Koehler, 2014; West, 2014). Klausen (2015) 
explains this further in noting that previously modelled ‘vertical’ internet control measures are 
ineffective when used to combat digitally nimble social media users. This can by 
characterizing social media as a flat horizontal environment that can be edited, republished, 
contributed to by multiple users from virtually any location that has an internet connection 
(Klausen, 2015). The dilemma in this is that adaptive entity that is a social media presence 
cannot easily be deleted, as it is not central and singular, in fact it can be manipulated from 
virtually anywhere by any number of users. Somewhat converse to this position, Berger and 
Morgan (2015) do note that the sustained campaign to suspend Islamic State’s Twitter 
presence and known accounts have proved successful, without being terminally destructive to 
the organization. The success of the Twitter account suspension initiative can be quantified by 
the known number of daily tweets that are attributed to known Islamic State accounts, which 
fell from approximately 40,000 daily tweets at the start of the account suspension campaign to 
under 5,000 daily tweets (Berger and Morgan, 2015). Taking in the learning from both points 
of view, we arrive at the strategic thinking that efforts to target the social media presence of 
terrorist organizations should be continued and adapted to a changing social media landscape, 
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however this cannot be the stand along strategy to combat organizations that is as digitally 
savvy and nimble as Islamic State or Al Qaeda.   
 
Adaptability 
It has been observed that terrorist groups are not passively waiting consumers of third 
party developed digital advances. Broadly, the evolving nature of digital technology has been 
more effectively utilized by terrorist organizations than governments, which is evidenced 
through the ability of these organizations to take advantage of social media and realise the 
communication potential of the internet (Thomas, 2003; Mackinlay, 2009). Terrorist 
organizations have been far more effective than states in making social media platforms work 
for them, in part because terrorist organizations have no need for communication frameworks 
and ethical constraints, while state actors must work within acceptable parameters (Thomas, 
2003; Mackinlay, 2009). Perhaps this ability to be adaptive could be explained as terrorist 
groups having access to all digital advantage without any restriction, while the innovative 
potential of state actors is curtailed by required regulatory compliance. The opportunity to 
evolve digitally and develop cyber strategies that further the interests of a terrorist 
organization, without consideration of laws or convention is a clear benefit that terrorist 
organizations have over legitimate cyber entities.  
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have been somewhat of a Twitter failure, unable to 
effectively gain ground in building a sustainable social media presence (Torres-Soriano, 
2016). However, following failures using Twitter, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb actively 
pursued an alternative digital media platform in which material could be uploaded and 
accessed (Torres-Soriano, 2016). While this does not show the social media adaptability of 
this organization, it does highlight that there are various alternative platforms that terrorist 
organizations have access to in order to propagate their material and ideology.  
The adaptive digital ability of terrorist groups can be displayed through an Islamic 
State example (Neumann, 2012; Anti-Defamation League, 2014). The adaptability of Islamic 
State is customised to a problem, being that Twitter sites associated to the organization have 
been suspended (Neumann, 2012; Anti-Defamation League, 2014). The digital learning of 
Islamic State resulted in development of a proxy smartphone application named Dawn of 
Glad Tidings, which allows Islamic State to utilize external Twitter accounts linked to the 
application to tweet statements, despite their own known Twitter accounts having been 
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suspended (Anti-Defamation League, 2014; Tadjdeh, 2014). Further, Islamic State have also 
displayed the ability to push-out their continuing digital presence through such methods of 
linking onto Twitter tweets through high jacking hashtags as well as maintaining an extensive 
proxy-server network from which propaganda material can be disseminated (Tadjdeh, 2014). 
A number of years prior to the report of the Anti-Defamation League (2014) that refers to the 
creation of the Islamic State Dawn of Glad Tidings application, Neumann (2012) predicted 
that advantages of smartphones and application development would become a new focus of 
extremist organizations. This shows that terrorist groups, particularly Islamic State, have 
become adaptive and exploitative digital users, these groups now possess the ability to use 
social media platforms as they desire and have the ability to circumvent interventions (Anti-
Defamation League, 2014). As Schmidt (2013) also notes any strategy that aims to counter 
the digital presence of terrorist groups must be aimed at discrediting the propaganda, as the 
task of removing, blocking or deleting the platforms of propaganda is not an achievable goal. 
The spirit of Schmidt’s (2013) position is that the digital presence of terrorist organizations is 
beyond deletion and there is far more value in state actors themselves utilising digital 
advancements to propagate counter-terrorism strategies, rather than simply attempting to 
curtail its pervasive nature. However, this strategy should be conducted complementarily to a 
sustained extremist group social media presence suppression initiative, such as the activity 
that is achieving some gains in suspending Islamic State Twitter accounts (Berger and 
Morgan, 2015). Additional to the ability to overcome attempts at digital intervention, what 
this ability also shows is that social media and the propagation of material also preserves the 
digital existence of terrorist organizations.  
 There is extensive evidence that digital technology as a means of achieving easy and 
readily available communication, has been highly advantageous to terrorist organizations. 
This is true in all facets of communication, including one to one exchanges, creating groups 
that provide commonality, training, recruitment and many platforms for reaching an audience 
through propaganda dissemination. 
 
Digital Operation 
To this point, this article has focused on social media and the internet broadly as a 
communication mechanism that served terrorist organisation priorities. Additional to this 
focus, operational aspects of social media use within terrorist organizations will also be 
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discussed. Utilizing social media and the internet to achieve operational goals involves two 
main approaches, being cyber-based attacks intended to directly result in casualty and terror, 
as well as digital activities that support the organization without the activity being intended to 
cause direct harm (Denning, 2001; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004; Rogan, 2006; West, 2014). A 
useful explanation of cyber-terrorism is provided by Heickero, who quotes Professor Dorothy 
Dennings in defining cyber-terrorism as: 
 
“…illegal, socially or politically determined assault or threat of assault against 
computers, networks and stored information” (Heickerö, 2014. pg. 554).  
 
Although short, this description of cyber-terrorism is quite useful while examining the 
role of social media and the internet in terrorism organization operation. In addition to the 
broad summary of targets that may be vulnerable to cyber-terrorism (Heickero, 2014), it can 
be inferred that social media may also provide a platform for cyber-terrorism attacks that is 
open to terrorist organizations. The prominent benefit of operations that targeted at cyber-
entities, may simply be the availability of the target (Heickero, 2014). Due to the prevalence 
of social media in every aspect of daily life, digitally vulnerable targets have been created and 
presented to terrorist organizations that possess digital operation capability to an extent that 
these vulnerabilities can be exploited.   
Within the use of social media as a means for conducting terrorism, there is also a 
separation of purposes (Thomas, 2003; Rogan, 2006). Rogan (2006) groups all terrorism 
related activity together under the term ‘Jihadism Online’, however draws the distinction 
between coordination of activity and specific acts of cyber-terrorism that seek to cause 
casualties. This distinction is significant, as there is difference in intention between utilizing 
digital means as a coordination tool and propaganda beacon in comparison to utilising the 
same technologies as a mechanism for causing catastrophic harm (Rogan, 2006; Stohl, 
2007). Moving forward towards digital operations, the practice of terrorist organizations 
cultivating digital operatives, perhaps hackers is acknowledged and the potential for a digital 
terrorist attack exists, however there is no known evidence that any terrorist group has 
successfully utilized digital technology with the goal of causing casualties (Stohl, 2007; 
Henschke, 2014; West, 2014). Hence, the benefit of digital technology to organizational 
operations may be more of a coordinating nature (Thomas, 2003). Although this digital 
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susceptibility to digitally capable terrorist organizations is present, The Center for the Study 
of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare suggests that cyber-attacks are most likely to be deployed 
to support conventional terrorism activity (Wilson, 2005). The disastrous potential 
consequences of a destructively intended cyber-terrorist attack are acknowledged, however it 
is considered more likely that the basis of jihadism online is exploitative rather than 
destructive (Rogan, 2006; West, 2014). West (2014) suggests in stronger terms that given the 
technical complexity and financial outlay required to conduct a catastrophic infrastructural 
cyber-attack, it seems unlikely that a terrorist attack of this kind would be carried out. The 
potential threat and resultant impact of a successful digitally-based terrorism attack should be 
acknowledged, however it appears far more likely that coordination of effort and 
communication amongst members, which is easily achieved through social media, presents a 
much more usable benefit to terrorist organizations (Thomas, 2003; Rudner, 2016). Thomas 
(2003) notes that the internet is an outstanding asset for coordination and refers to the ability 
of insurgent groups to coordinate activities in one target country while remaining in a 
separate country. The coordination benefits that social media and the internet provide to 
terrorist groups is extensive, as it allows communication beyond vast distances as well as 
providing immediate availability of communication (Thomas, 2003; Soo Hoo, Goodman & 
Greenburg; Rudner, 2016).  
However, the benefit of a successfully conducted cyber-terrorism attacks can be 
quickly understood. The potential resultant chaos could potentially exceed that of a violent 
terrorist attack, such as a bombing, while there is a greatly reduced risk of exposure and loss 
of operatives (Thomas, 2003; Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenburg). Consider the possibility of 
a cyber-attack that totally compromised the electrical infrastructure of a city. Within current 
societal settings, in which digital infrastructure is deeply embedded in government and 
public administration, a total loss of electricity would have potential to cripple healthcare, 
water supply, financial institutions, domestic living conditions and potentially could impact 
on every aspect of life (Rogan, 2006; Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenburg, 2008).  
Social media and digital platforms are continuing to evolve, becoming further and 
further intertwined into institutional infrastructures, which is provides significant benefit to 
industry and institution, however the open and accessible nature of these digital platforms 
also provides a digital attack target, as Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenburg say: “…this new 
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information infrastructure has become both an asset to defend and an avenue by which other 
infrastructures may be attacked” (Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg, 2008. pg.1).  
While the potential for catastrophic impact of digital infrastructure vulnerability 
exists, it appears that currently this manner of cyber-attack would require a prohibitively 
high level of technical expertise and resourcing in order to succeed in a cyber-attack against 
digital infrastructure (Heickerö, 2014; West, 2014). Stohl (2007) explains the concept of 
widespread digital attack against a state entity as political threat, rather than being any 
sustained campaign. However, this is where another benefit lies, the threat and concern that 
may be caused by the possibility of such a crippling attack meets the end-goal of a terrorist 
organization, being to spread terror (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004; Tabansky, 2011). This is the 
advantage of social media within digital operations and cyber-terrorism, being that 
information can be distrusted to audiences efficiently within a platform that encourages 
interaction between audience and transmitter (Aly, 2016). Thomas (2003) explains this 
further and notes that the potential disaster resultant from a cyber-terrorism can be the goal 
of cyber-terrorism, which for instance targets transit vehicles traffic signals to cause 
collisions, or shutting down power grids. The fear of these potential catastrophic outcomes 
can be achieved through nothing more than a terrorist group posting or tweeting their 
intention to carry out a cyber-attack and if social media is exploited effectively terror is 
likely to spread (Thomas, 2003; Wilson, 2005; Stohl, 2007; Khalil, 2014, Aly, 2016). It is 
clear that through effective use of social media, terrorist organizations are provided with the 
platform and ready opportunity to interact with their audience. Social media has become so 
ingrained and relied upon in many aspects of civilian life, as well as civil infrastructure, to an 
extent that a previously unavailable arena of attack has been opened.  
Additionally, social media presents an information resource to terrorist groups, who 
may seek to gather intelligence, target individuals, encourage vulnerable persons to 
participate in action or travel to the caliphate (Denning, 2001; Cukier and Mayer-
Schoenberger, 2013; West, 2014; Klausen, 2015). The wealth of information that is social 
media and the internet has become a valuable data resource that contains extensive 
professional and personal information including financial interests, medical records, criminal 
records, personal data, social interests, location, religious beliefs, family linkages et cetera 
(Denning, 2001; Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger, 2013; West, 2014; Rudner, 2016). 
Denning (2001) refers to the internet as a data storage mechanism and states: 
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“One way of viewing the Internet is as a vast digital library. The web alone offers 
several billion pages of information, and much of the information is free” (Denning, 
2001. pg. 243). 
 
There is potential for locating almost endless swathes of information on any subject 
that for example may include whereabouts of individuals, identification information, financial 
account information of individuals or states, recreational trends of a demographic, or perhaps 
obtaining transit information for groups of individuals (Denning, 2001; West, 2014). Thomas 
(2003) also discusses the internet as a resource of information in the context of operational 
planning. As has been discussed, the internet presents a vast volume of digital property from 
individuals, organizations and governments (Denning, 2001; West, 2014). There is obvious 
commercial benefit in collecting sensitive information that may support organizational 
sustainability, however Thomas (2003) goes further and refers to this information being 
available as assets to intelligence analysis and operational planning. Information technology, 
particularly social media have become so imbedded in society that it provides both an access 
point to and a wealth of information that terrorist organizations may see value in exploiting 
(Denning, 2001; West, 2014; Rudner, 2016). 
 
Conclusion & Digital Extremism Counter-Measures  
It is clear that increased communication capability, through social media and the 
internet are a far reaching benefit that has revolutionised operating methods of terrorist 
organizations. Social media benefits also include availability of exploitable data that may 
support operational planning, intelligence analysis as well as organizational sustainability 
through financial resourcing. Additionally, social media has provided terrorist organizations 
with a digital platform from which there is potential for exclusively cyber-based attacks, 
simply through message dissemination.  
Furthermore, cyber space and social media presences have provided a safe space of 
significant imperviousness to interventions, enabling terrorists to communicate, train and exist 
beyond the reach of interventions.  
It seems that the paramount benefit that social media and internet mechanisms have 
provided to terrorist organizations is communication, which is easily achieved, cost effective 
and far reaching.  
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As has been discussed previously, social media has presented terrorist organizations 
with many advantages in coordinating operations, reaching potential Jihadis and engaging 
with their intended audiences. However, these same advantages can be utilized by counter-
terrorism and counter-violent extremism actors to achieve gains against these organizations. 
Firstly, as Berger and Morgan (2015) note, there have been practical efforts to engage with 
groups such as Islamic State in the social media realm with covert accounts that aim to 
provide access to intelligence and organizational propaganda. In a more overt manner, 
narratives that counter the ideology and doctrine of terrorist organisations can be more widely 
disseminated to the same vast audience that organizations have access to, includes in-
organization Jihadis, potential radicals, the wider public audience and communities that are 
affected by terrorist organization activity (Braddock and Horgan, 2015).  
Aly (2016) explains the communication exchange between a transmitter and receiver 
as being dynamic and interactive. Accordingly, if counter-narrative messages are to be 
effective in engaging an audience, the interactive and adaptive nature of social media must be 
the delivery mechanism through which these counter-narratives are delivered. Platforms such 
as Facebook and Twitter are interactive by design and encourage exchange between audience 
and transmitter, as well as being dynamic in meeting the needs of a changing target audience.   
With minimal effort, social media allow communication between terrorists, with 
potential recruits and with the public audience. The adaptive ability of terrorist organizations 
in their use of social media highlights the digital potential to reach audiences, gather 
information, disseminate messages and coordinate activities. By viewing the social media 
presence as a tool for collecting intelligence, conducting digital counter-operations and also 
overtly discrediting terrorist organizations in their own digital space, counter-violent 
extremism strategists and policy makers may make gains against terrorist organizations. 
These same communication advantages can be realised by states and non-government 
agencies, hence counter-violent extremism strategies that integrate digital platforms as 
communication and outreach advantages are where counter-measures should begin.  
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